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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE TAX COIVIMISSION OF THE 
STi-\.TE OF UTAH, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
F. P. LINFORD, VOYLE B. BAR,BER 




BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATE:MENT O·F FACTS 
This is an appeal from an order of the 4th Judicial 
District ·Court sustaining the demurrer to plaintiff's com-
plaint and dismissing the action without leave to amend. 
The facts which appellant believes give rise to a cause of 
action, and as set forth in its complaint, are as follows: 
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The appellant, State Tax C'ommission~ is a body politic 
charged with the duty of collecting sales tax, Title 80, Chap-
ter 15, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. On the 7th day of April, 
1947, the respondents entered into an undertaking with 
appellant whereby they would jointly and severally be liable 
to the /people of the state of Utah in the sum of $1,000 law-
ful money of the United States. 
That said obligation was upon the expressed condition 
thereunder written, that as the bounden principal, the Orem 
Motor Company, Inc., should well and truly comply with all 
the provisions of the Sales Tax Act and any amendments 
thereto, and in particular pay all taxes, interest and penal-
ties promptly when due, in which case this obligation was 
to be null and void; otherwise to remain in fuJI force and 
effect. 
That said obligation was upon the further condition 
thereunder written, that upon failure of the principal, the 
Orem Motor Company, Inc., to comply with any or all of the 
provisions of the Sales Tax Act and any amendments there-
to, that after demand by the State Tax Commission upon 
the principal to comply with the provisions of said act and 
to cease the violation and said principal should not perform 
or cause to be performed all acts necessary to conform com-
pletely to the requirements of said act, then the State T'ax 
Commission should within 60 days from the date when notice 
and demand for payment of all taxes, interest and penalties 
was made, give written notice to the sureties, postage pre-
paid to the last known address, of such violation by said prin-
cipal and should make demand upon the sureties for the 
payment of the amount of the default by said principal, up to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
but not to exceed the amount of the liability as defined by 
this bond. 
That pursuant to the provisions of Title 80, Chapter 15, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, said principal, theOrem Motor 
Company, Inc., should have filed a sales tax return for the 
period November-December, 1947, and remitted the sales 
tax shown to be due thereon; that said principal, the Orem 
Motor Company, Inc., filed a sales tax return for the period 
November-December, 1'947, but failed to remit the tax shown 
to be due thereon in the sum of $808.24; therefore, penalty 
in the amount of $80.32 and interest in the amount of $4.08 
were assessed by the Tax Commission of the State of Utah 
pursuant to the provisions of Title 80, Chapter 1:5, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, the total sum being $893.14. 
That on the 26th day of January, 1948, notice and 
demand for payment within 10 days of the delinquent sales 
tax due for the period above mentioned with penalty and 
interest, the amount due being in the sum of $89~3-.14, was 
made upon the principal, theOrem Motor ·Company, Inc. 
That the Orem Motor Company, Inc., the principal on 
the bond above mentioned, did not pay such delinquent sales 
tax nor respond in any manner whatsoever to the notice 
and demand for payment of the same within 10 days or at 
any time up to the filing of the complaint. 
·That on the 2·5th day of March, 19-48, payment not hav-
ing been made in any amount on the sales tax owing by the 
Orem Motor Company, Inc., notice and demand for payment 
was made upon the defendants, F. P. Linford, Voyle B. 
Barber and Raymond Peterson. 
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That at the time of the filing of this complaint no part 
of the sales tax delinquency has been paid by either the Orem 
Motor Company, Inc., or the sureties on the bond which said 
corporation filed as security for payment of the same (R. 1 
and 2.). 
The respondents demurred on the grounds : 
1. That said complaint does not state a cause of action 
against the defendants or either of them. 
2. That there is a defect or misjoinder of parties de-
fendant. 
3. That said complaint fails to allege that there was 
any consideration for defendants' signing as surety for the 
Orem Motor Company. 
4. That said complaint fails to allege by what author-
ity plaintiff accepted the written undertaking upon which 
this suit is predicated (R. 4). 
After argument the trial court sustained the demurrer 
as to grounds 1, 3 and 4, and overruled the demurrer as to 
ground 2·. 
ASSIGNMEN'T O'F ERRORS 
Appellant contends that the trial court in making its 
decision er~ed in the following particulars : 
(a) In sustaining the demurrer to appellant's com-
plaint as to grounds 1, 3 and 4 and ordering the cause dis-
missed. 
(b) In ordering the cause dismissed without leave to 
amend. 
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QUESTIONS PRE,SENTED 
As appellant views this case, grounds 3 and 4, as set 
forth in the demurrer, are not actually grounds for demurrer 
but are reasons why the respondents consider that the 
complaint, as filed, does not set forth a cause of action. The 
primary question, therefore, to be decided by this Honor-
able Court is: Does the complaint as filed set forth a cause 
of action against the respondents? 
The trial court in considering the demurrer in this 
case considered only the question as to whether the appel-
lant, State Tax Commission, had authority to accept the 
written undertaking upon which this suit is predicated. 
(See memorandum decisions R. 13-15, and R. 2:3~26.) Inas-
much as there is nothing in the complaint which shows no 
consideration was given, such defense, if valid at all, must 
be taken by answer and not demurrer. It is felt that the 
question of consideration may be overcome by amending 
the complaint in the court below. Therefore, this question 
need not be determined by this court. 
It is believed, then, that this case may be settled by 
answering the following questions : 
1. Does the complaint, as filed, fail to state a cause 
of action inasmuch as it fails to allege by what authority 
appellant accepted the written undertaking upon which this 
suit is predicated? 
If the court should decide that such complaint is faulty 
for this reason, it will then be necessary to answer a second 
question. 
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2. Does the appellant, State Tax Commission, have 
authority to require the type of written undertaking upon 
which this suit is predicated? 
AR:GUMENT 
Point 1. 
Does the complaint as filed fail to state a cause of 
action inasmuch as it fails to allege by what authority 
appellant accepted the written undertaking upon which this 
suit is predicated? 
At the threshold of this argument, it should be observed 
that the appellant takes the view it does have the authority 
to require security to be given whenever it deems it neces-
sary in order to insure compliance with the provisions of the 
Emergency Revenue Act of 1933, as amended, and that the 
bond involved herein is such security. However, we take the 
view that, even though the State Tax Commission does not 
have such authority, the complaint as filed sets forth a 
cause of action against the respondents. It is the law in 
this jurisdiction that a complaint is not vulnerable to a 
general demurrer if, under its allegations, plaintiff may 
prove such a state of facts and inferences as would with-
stand a motion for nonsuit. Eddington v. Union Portland 
Cement Co., 42 Utah 27 4, 281, 130 Pac. 243. 
While the question as to the effect to be given to a 
written undertaking taken by a public officer in the absence 
of specific statutory authority has not been decided by the 
Supreme ~Court of the state of Utah, the almost uniform 
authority holds that such an undertaking is not invalidated 
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and the bond is valid as a common law obligation or as a 
contractual obligation voluntarily undertaken. 
In the early case of Central Banking and Security Co. 
v. United States Fidelity and Gua.ranty Co. et al., 80 S. E. 
121, the Supreme Court of West Virginia considered a situ-
ation wherein a clerk of the county court had, without statu-
tory authority, taken a new bond from the administrator 
of an estate. The validity of the bond was denied on account 
of the lack of authority in the clerk of the county court to 
take such bond. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia in summarizing the law in this situation said: 
"As the statute nowhere confers upon the clerk 
authority to take a new bond from a personal repre-
sentative or other fiduciary, and makes it his duty to 
report to the court the necessity thereof, it may well 
be conceded he had no authority to take either of the 
two substitute bonds, but their absolute invalidity 
and worthlessness does not necessarily follow. Every 
bond taken without authority in the officer who took 
it is not void. Such bonds are often held good as 
common-law obligations. Numerous authorities hold-
ing them void are cited in support of the cross-assign-
ments of error, but the bonds in those cases were, 
for the most part, held void because the taking there-
of contravened a principle of public policy. Most of 
them were recognizances under which officers had 
discharged prisoners. One of them involved in Bene-
dict v. Bray, 2 Cal. 251, 56 Am. D·ec. 332, was a void 
attachment bond, but the opinion is unsatisfactory. 
It assumes, contrary to almost uniform authority~ 
that all bonds, taken by officers not authorized to 
take them, are void. T'he law on this subject was 
summarized by Judge Green in Porter's Ex'r v. 
Daniels, 11 W. Va. 250, in the following terms: 'The 
mere fact that a bond not authorized by law has been 
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taken by an officer does not render such bond invalid 
at common law. Such bonds have been frequently 
held void at common law, but wherever so held, it has 
been not simply because taken by an officer without 
authority, but for other and sufficient reasons ap-
pearing in each particular case-such as that they 
were not voluntarily executed; that they were given 
to the officer, to induce him to violate his duty as 
such officer; or to induce him to perform a duty he 
was bound to perform without the giving of such 
bond; that the taking of the bond was oppressive, 
and it was given without consideration; that the 
obligee in the bond had no interest in the subject-
matter; that the taking of the bond was a violation 
of public policy, or was executed under circum-
stances, or contained provisions, which would have 
rendered a private bond void at law.' These bonds 
were voluntarily given for consideration paid to the 
sureties, and neither the acceptance nor the giving 
of the same contravenes any principle of public 
policy. Hence, they are clearly good as common-law 
obligations." 
The reasons why a bond taken without authority might 
be held invalid as summarized in the opinion of Judge 
Green are not present in the case at Bar. O,r, if present at 
all, do not appear on the face of the complaint and, there-
fore, cannot be reached by a general demurrer. So far as 
appears from the facts now before the court, the bond was 
voluntarily executed. We take the view that if defendants 
claim such bond not to have been voluntarily executed, such 
defense must be taken by answer and not by demurrer. 
Further, there is nothing to show that it was given to an 
officer of the Tax ,Commission to induce him to violate his 
duty, or to induce him to perform a duty he was bound to 
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perform without the giving of such bond, the bond in this 
case being exacted pursuant to 80-15-5, Utah Code An-
notated, 1943, which authorizes the commission "to require 
any person subject to the tax imposed hereunder to deposit 
with it such security as the Tax Commission may determine." 
Nor can it be said that the taking of the bond was oppressive; 
that it was given 'vithout consideration; that the obligee in 
the bond had no interest in the subject-matter; that the 
taking of the bond was a violation of public policy or executed 
under circumstances or contained provisions which would 
have rendered a private bond void at law. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas in considering a similar 
situation arrived at the same conclusion, i. e. that a bond 
taken without statutory authority gives rise to a common-
law obligation or a contractual obligation voluntarily under-
taken. State ex rel Hendrick Co. Atty. v. Hartford Accident 
& Indemnity Co., Hartford, Conn., 114 Pac. 2d 812. In that 
case, the Supreme Court of Kansas was considering a situa-
tion wherein a juvenile court had required a person to whom 
custody of a child was being given to deposit a bond with 
the court, the bond being to insure the delivery of the child 
upon order of the court. No statutory authority was given 
to the juvenile court tq require such bond. The Supreme 
Court in speaking with reference to the validity of a bond, 
held: 
"While the bonds not provided for by statute 
and extorted by public officers, under color of their 
office, are not enforceable, the general rule is that 
the mere absence of specific statutory authority for 
the giving of a bond does not invalidate a bond which 
is given voluntarily and which is not in contraven-
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tion of public policy. It is valid as a common-law 
obligation, or as a contractual obligation voluntarily 
undertaken. 9 C. J. p. 29, sec. 45 and cases there 
cited; 11 C. J. S., Bonds sec. 27; 8 Am. Jur. p. 721, 
sec. 35; Constable v. National Steamship Co., 154 
U.S. 51, 14 S. Ct. 1062, 38 L. Ed. 903, 916." 
In view of these authorities, we take the view that the 
complaint is not defective inasmuch as it fails to allege by 
what authority the appellant accepted the written under-
taking. 
Point 2. 
Does the appellant, State Tax Commission, have author-
ity to require the, type, of written und:ertaking upon which 
this suit is predicated? 
The learned trial judge took the view that 80-15-5, 
Utah 'Code Annotated, 1943, above quoted, does not vest 
authority in the State Tax Commission to require the type 
of security as is herein involved (R. 13-15 and R. '23-26). 
Such view necessitated the sustaining of the demurrer with-
out leave to amend. 
Notwithstanding the fact that, as we view the law, 
no allegation of authority is necessary in a suit of this type, 
appellant takes the view and submits to the court that the 
State Tax ·Commission o.f the state of Utah- does in-iact 
·--
h~ye __ a,~thority to requir~. the type of undertaking upon 
which this suit is predicated. 
The State Tax Commission of the state of Utah is 
vested with the responsibility of administering and enforc-
ing the provisions of the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933. 
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In the early administration of the Act, the Tax Commission 
experienced considerable difficulty in collecting the sales 
tax from certain retailers. Therefore, in its fourth biennial 
report for the years 1937-1938, the Tax Commission recom-
mended, among other things, that the collection procedure 
be changed so as to ·allow the Commission to require the 
posting of a bond. This recommendation, as found on page 
38 of the fourth biennial report of the State Tiax ·Commis-
sion of Utah, for the years 1937-1938, reads as follows: 
"There are certain changes which we consider 
should be made in the present law in order to improve 
the administration of the Act and to facilitate the 
collection of the tax. These changes cover such items 
* * * (2) collection procedure, including post-
ing of bond; * * * (Italics supplied.) 
"These proposed changes will be drafted into 
proper bills and submitted to the legislature together 
with complete explanations giving our reasons for 
such changes." 
A bill incorporating the proposed change to allow the 
posting of a bond to insure collection procedure was pre-
pared by the members of the Tax Commission and was 
submitted to the Legislature. In response to this recom-
mendation, the Emergency Revenue Act was amended by the 
next session of the Legislature. (Laws of Utah, 1939, Chap-
ter 103,); (80-15-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1943), so as to 
include the following provisions : 
"The state tax commission, whenever it deems 
it necessary to insure compliance with the provisions 
of this act, may require any person subject to the 
tax imposed hereunder to deposit with it such secur-
ity as the state tax commission may determine. The 
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same may be sold by the state tax commission at 
public sale if it becomes necessary so to do in order 
to recover any tax, interest or penalty due. Notice 
of such sale may be served upon the person who 
deposited such securities personally or by mail; if 
by mail, notice sent to the last known address as the 
same appears in the records of the state tax com-
. mission shall be sufficient for the purposes of this 
requirement. Upon any such sale the surplus, if any, 
above the amounts due under this act, shall be re-
turned to the person who deposited the security." 
After the Act was so amended, the Commission, pur-
suant to authority vested in it by 80-15-20, Utah Code An-
notated, 1943, passed a regulation which reads as follows: 
"8. Bonds. 
(Applies to sales tax only) 
"In all cases where the ~~at::ta~:E!lllllJl~ion 
dg_ems it _!!~~~~~ry to insure comprraTice with the 
provisions of the act, vendors are required to post 
a bond or other security as a condition to their ob-
taining a license under the Act Such bonds shall be 
in the form and for such amounts as the state tax 
commission deems appropriate under the particular 
circumstances." 
While this regulation was promulgated earlier, it was 
first published effective January 1, 1944, and has been in 
continuous effect since that time. Since the passing of the 
amendment, the ·commission has uniformily required the 
posting of a bond with either personal or corporate sureties. 
The form of the bond as required by the Commission and 
as executed and signed by the respondents, is as follows : 
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BOND OF UTAH RETAILER 
EXECUTED PURSUANT TO DEMAND FOR SEC'UR11TY 
UNDER THE EMERGEN·CY REVENUE AIC'T O~F 19-33 
AS AMENDED 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That we, ______ ----------------------------- ________ of_________________________________ _ 
(name) (address) 
as principal, and ___________________ _ _ __of ______________________________________ , 
and _________________________________________ --------_---------of------------------------------------, 
and _________________________________________________________ of------------------------------------, 
as sureties, are jointly and severally held and firmly bound 
unto the people of the State of Utah in the sum of _______________ _ 
----------------------------------------------------- ( $------------------------) Ia wful 
money of the United States of America, for the payment 
whereof well and truly to be made we bind ourselves, our 
heirs, executors, successors and assigns, jointly and several-
ly, firmly by these presents. 
The condition of the foregoing obligation is such that, 
WHEREAS, the above bounden principal has made ap-
plication for a license to engage in business in Utah, pur-
suant to the provisions of the Emergency· Revenue Act of 
1933, as amended, and that pursuant to the application a 
license has been or is about to be issued ; and 
WHEREAS, a demand has been made upon the prin-
cipal by the State Tax Commission for security for the pay-
ment of the tax. 
NOW, THEREFORE, if the above bounden principal 
shall well and truly comply with all the provisions of said 
Act and any amendments thereto, and in particular pay all 
taxes, interest and penalties promptly when due, including 
both taxes, interest and penalties now due and those which 
may become due, then this obligation shall be null and void; 
otherwise to remain in full force and effect. 
Upon the failure of the principal herein to comply with 
any or all of the provisions of said Act and any amendments 
thereto, and in particular on the principal's failure to pay 
all taxes, interest and penalties promptly when due and 
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when demanded by the State Tax Commission, the State Tax 
Commission shall within 60 days from the date when notice 
and demand for paym.ent of all taxes, interest and penalties 
was made give written notice to the sureties, postage pre-
paid to their last known address of such principal's failure 
to comply with the provisions of said Act or of failure to 
make payment of all taxes, interest and penalties due and 
shall make demand upon the sureties for the payment of the 
amount of the default by said principal, up to but not to 
exceed the amount of their liability as defined by this bond, 
and in addition any costs or attorneys fees incurred in col-
lecting the same from said sureties. 
)The surety or sureties herein reserve the right to with-
draw as such sureties, except as to any liability already in-
curred or accrued hereunder, and may do so upon the giving 
of written notice of such withdrawal to the State Tax Com-
mission; provided, however, that no withdrawal shall be 
effective for any purpose until thirty days shall have elapsed 
from and after the receipt of such notice by said Commission, 
and further provided that no withdrawal shall in anywise 
affect the liability of said surety arising out of any sales 
made by the principal herein prior to the expiration of such 
period of thirty days, regardless of whether or not an assess-
ment for tax due on the receipts from such sales has been 
levied before the lapse of such thirty days. 
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·CORPORATE A·CKNO·WLEDGMENT OF PRINCIPAL 
(TO BE EXEC·UT.ED BY C'ORPORA·TIO,NS. WIT'HOUT 
CORPORATE SEAL) 
STATE OF _________________ -------------} 
COUNTY OF ----------------------------- SS. 
On the ____________ day of ---------·- ______________ in the year ___________ _ 
before me personally appeared ________________________________________________ , 
to be known, who, being by me duly sworn, did depose and 
say: That he reside in---------------------------------------------------------: that 
he is the ----------------------------------------------- of the ________________________ , 
the corporation which executed the above instrument and 
which is described therein; that he signed the above men-
tioned instrument on ·behalf of the said corporation; that 
he was authorized to do so by Article ____________ of the Articles 
of Incorporation of the said corporation, and by order of the 
Board of Directors of said ·Corporation; and that his signa-
ture as it thus appears in the above instrument is binding 
upon the corporation. 
Notary Public 
A·FFIDA VIT. BY SURETY 
STATE 0 F UTAH ------------------------------} 
CO·UNTY 0 F --------------------------------------- SS. 
I, ___________ _: __________________________________ , being duly sworn upon 
oath, do depose and say that I am one of the sureties named 
in the bond to which this Affidavit is attached, and that I 
am a resident householder in ------------------------------------ County, 
State of Utah, and that I am possessed in my own name of 
real and personal property, other than my homestead, at 
reasonable value in excess of $ ________________________________ , free and 
clear of all encumbrances. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ________________ day of 
------ ___________________________________________ , 19 --------· 
My Commission Expires : 
(SEA·L) (Notary Public) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
Turning now to an analysis of the wording of 80-15-5, 
Utah Code Annotated, .1943, we must first consider just 
what is meant by the term "security." No comprehensive 
and exact legal definition of the term "security" is possible. 
It is possible to find most any definition desired and such 
may be found in a relatively few pages by consulting volume 
38, Words and Phrases, pages 469 to 487. One definition 
which would support the definition of the Tax Commission 
that a surety bond is a "security" is found in the case of 
Storm v. Waddell, N. Y., 2 Sandf. Ch. 494, 507, citing 2 
Bouv. Law Diet. 493, as set forth in 38 Words and Phrases, 
1,71: 
"'The term 'security' signifies that which makes 
secure or certain. In its proper use it relates to 
pecuniary matters, and often consists of a promise 
or right unattended with possession of the thing 
upon which it reposes. It implies in its con1mon ac-
ceptation that which prevents loss or makes safe. 
Dr. Johnson defines it as .anything given as a pledge 
or caution. Dean 8wift uses it as synonymous with 
'safety' or 'certainty.' Webster defines it as anything 
given or deposited to secure the payment of a debt or 
the performance of a contract, as a bond with surety, 
a mortgage, the indorsement of a responsible man, 
or a pledge. It is that which renders a matter sure; 
and instrument which renders certain the perform-
ance of a contract." (Italics supplied.) 
Also significant are the following: 
"The addition of the word 'security' to the signa-
ture of a bond shows prima facie that the person 
signing is a surety. Boulware v. Hartsook's Adm'r, 
3 S. E. 289, 291, 83 Va. 679, citing Harper's Adm'r 
v. McVeigh's Adm'r, 1 S. E'. 193, 82 Va. 751. 
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"In Code section authorizing court, upon 'secur-
ity' being first given, to open judgment entered for 
want of affidavit of defense, word 'security' is used 
in sense of 'surety'; that is, bond with surety or 
sureties. Rev. Code 1915, 4169. Penn. Central Light 
& Pmver Co. v. Central Eastern Power Co., 171 A. 
332, 6 lV. W. Harr. 74. 
"The word 'security' is often used in the Code 
in the sense of 'surety.' Thus the applicant for an 
attachment must give bond with good security, and 
one filing a claim to property levied on, in order to 
replevy the property, must give bond with good and 
sufficient security, so that the word 'security' as 
used in the phrase 'and to give security for the 
eventual condemnation money,' appearing in section 
4819 of the Civil Code, which pro~ides for entering 
a defense to the levy of a distress warrant, means 
that the defendant in such warrant must give a bond 
with a surety or sureties thereon, and the levying 
officer is not authorized to take in lieu of such bond 
a deposit of money. Goggins v. Jones, 41 S. E. 995, 
996, 115 Ga. 596." 
We submit that the appellant, State T'ax ·Commission, 
has made a practical interpretation of the statute involved 
and that its view of the term "security" being a bond is 
proper in view of the definition of "security'" as herein set 
forth and particularly in view of the fact that the change 
made in 80-15-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, was made 
upon the recommendation and_ advice of the T'ax ·Commis-
sion. The Tax ·Commission, by long administrative interpre-
tation, has always considered the word "security" to mean 
a bond with either personal or corporate sureties. It is ad-
mittedly true that a misinterpretation of the statute gives 
no regularity to such interpretation; however, the Supreme 
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Court of Utah, in the case of Board of State Land Commis-
sioners v. Ririe (1920), 56 Utah 213, 190 Pac. 59, said: 
"While it is true that the construction of a stat-
ute by the executive department is not binding upon 
the courts, it is, nevertheless, also true, and is so 
determined by the overwhelming weight of authority, 
that unless such construction does violence to the 
apparent intent of the language used it is entitled 
to serious consideration by the courts, and especially 
so if the statute has been in force for any great 
length of time and has been so construed." 
This statement of the law was acquiesced in by this 
court in In re Cowan's Estate, (1940) 98 U. 393, 99 Pac. 2d 
605, and was reaffirmed in the case of Utah Concrete Pro-
ducts Co. v. State Tax Commission (1942), 101 U. 513, 125 
Pac. 2d 408, and E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Commission, 
168 Pac. 2d 332. 
The interpretation placed by the State Tax Commis-
sion upon the word "security" has been in effect since 1939 
when the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933 was amended 
to allow the Commission to require security. And it is sub-
mitted such interpretation does no violence to the apparent 
intent of the language, the intent being to make sure or cer-
tain that provisions of the Emergency Revenue Act of 1'933 
will be complied with by the principal. The Commission has 
made the determination pursuant to authority vested in it 
by 80-15·-5, Utah ·code Annotated, 1943, that such bond 
shall be deemed sufficient security. 
It should be noted that in the nine years this provision 
has been in effect many hundreds of taxpayers have been 
required to post this type of bond with the ·Tax Commission, 
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and, further, that there are at the present time many such 
bonds posted with the Tax Commission to assure compliance 
with the provisions of the Act. We think that it is a reason-
able inference from Regulation #8, 80-15-5, Utah Code An-
notated, 1943, and from the form of the bond as written, that 
the primary reason for requiring a vendor to post a bond 
is to insure that the tax collected will be paid and that the 
only cases in which a bond would be required are cases where-
in the principal is in a precarious financial circumstance, or 
the nature of his business is such that he will incur a large 
tax liability, in which case, a sudden financial reverse would 
cause a loss of tax collected. 
The Tax ·Commission in dealing with taxpayers has 
found it necessary to require this type of security. We be-
lieve that in view of the type of taxpayer from whom security 
is required-that is taxpayers in precarious financial cir-
cumstances, or taxpayers incurring large tax liabilities-in 
. ~ 
the great majority of cases, the taxpayer who is required '\, 
to post security is financially not in a position to deposit 
any other type of security with the Tax Commission. Cer-
tainly a taxpayer who is in sufficiently difficult financial 
circumstances that the Commission deems it necessary to 
require him to post security to insure compliance with the 
Act, is not in a position to deposit negotiable instrument~,,. 
stocks, bonds, etc., which might be sold in strict compliance 
with the wording of the Act. To place such an interpretation 
on the languag~ contained in 80-15-5, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, we submit, is not a practical interpretation of the 
statute. Furthermore, there are a limited number of cases 
in which the vendor when required to post a bond desires 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
for one reason or another to post cash in lieu thereof. While 
the issues in this case are not concerned with the posting 
of a cash bond, we call the court's attention to the fact that 
such bonds are posted and certainly it would be an imprac-
tical interpretation of the statute to require a taxpayer 
desiring to post a cash bond to purchase negotiable secur-
ities which might decline in value. Such risk should not be 
imposed upon a taxpayer. 
The court below in making an analysis of the wording 
of 80-15-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, took the view that 
the remedy therein provided, that is, selling the security at 
public sale in order to secure any tax, was the only remedy 
(R. 14). With such interpretation we most respectfully dis-
agree. 1The words of the statute "'The same may be sold by 
the Tax Commission at public sale if it became necessary 
so to do in order to recover any tax, interest or penalty 
* * *"as we view them, are permissive or directory and 
not mandatory or exclusive. 
80-5-46, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which outlines the 
powers and duties of the Utah State T·ax Commission, among 
other things, authorizes the Commission "to sue and be sued 
in its own name." This court in the case of the State Tax 
Commission v. City of Logan (1936), 88 Utah 406, 54 Pac. 
2d 1197, in construing the general powers of the T:ax Com-
mission to sue and be sued, said : 
"* * * Article 13, Sec. 11, of our State Con-
stitution grants to the State Tax Commission super-
vision of the tax laws of the state. R. S. Utah 1933, 
80-5-46, contains an enumeration of the general 
powers and duties of the Commission. Power is there 
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conferred upon the Commission 'to sue and be sued 
in its own name,' and generally to supervise and 
direct the levy and collection of taxes. In the light of 
the fact that broad powers are conferred upon the 
Commission to levy and collect taxes, it would seem 
idle for the legislature to vest authority in the Com-
mission to sue in its own name unless it intended 
thereby that the Commission might sue for the col-
lection of taxes. Apparently one of the chief purposes 
of the legislatu're in granting to the Commission 
autho'Jity to sue was to enable it to enforce payment 
of taxes. The city's contention that the Commission 
is without authority to prosecute this action in its 
own name must fail." (Italics supplied.) 
This reasoning was set forth by the court in spite of the 
fact that section 11 of the Emergency Revenue Act of 19-3'3, 
as it was in effect when the case arose, provided specifically 
that the sales tax could be collected by appropriate judicial 
proceedings. 
Therefore, we contend that the State T'ax Commission 
having the power to sue in its own name may sue the respond-
ents in this case for the collection of the sales tax which the 
respondents have incurred a liability to pay by reason of the 
I 
default of the principal. 
There is one further principle which appellant feels 
should be considered by the court in making a determina-
tion as to the question of the authority of the Commission 
requiring posting of a bond. The section of the statute 
relied upon by the Commission, 80-15·-5, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 194,3, was amended by the Laws of Utah, chapter 
103 to include the provision hereinbefore quoted. No further 
amendment was made until the 1947 session of the legisla-
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ture (H. B. #48, approved February 24). The amendment 
passed made no change in that portion of 80~15-5, Utah ·Code 
Annotated, 1943, upon which the ·Commission relies as hav-
ing authority to require the posting of a bond. Inasmuch 
as the practice of the Commission in requiring bonds was 
adopted shortly after the 1939· amendment and such con-
struction was adopted by regulation and promulgated to 
the public and, further, since the public has come to rely 
on such regulation, we submit that the legislature knew of 
such ·construction and adopted it in re-enacting the statute. 
This court recognizing this doctrine in the case of Utah 
Power & Light Company v. Public Servic.e Commission 
(1944), 107 Utah 55, 152 Pac. 2d 542 cited considerable 
authority and held : 
"Closely allied to this argument (administrative 
construction) is the third argument in which the 
Company seeks to invoke the principle of law that 
when the legislature re-adopts a statute or act with-
out change after uniform and notorious construction 
by officers required to administer it the presumption 
is that the legislature knew of such construction and 
adopted it in re-enacting the statute. This doctrine 
has been criticized (see 54 Harvard Law Review p. 
1311, Article by A. H. Feller) but it nevertheless 
is supported by considerable authority. State Board 
of Land Commissioners v. Ririe, supra, 56 Utah 213, 
190 P. 59; Van Veen v. Graham County, 13 Ariz. 
167, 108 P. 252; City of Louisville v. Louisville School 
Board, 119 Ky. 57 4, 84 S. W. 729; State v. Sheldon, 
79 Neb. 455, 113 N. W. 208." 
We submit that in the event this court should determine 
that an allegation of authority be necessary in order to state 
a cause of action, that the appellant, State T·ax Commission, 
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should be allowed to amend its complaint and allege that the 
bond was taken pursuant to the provisions of 80-1~5-5·, Utah· 
Code Annotated, 1943. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, therefore, it is submitted that the com-
plaint of appellant, as filed in the court below, sets forth 
a cause of action against the respondents or may be amended 
so as to state a cause of action. 
We submit that the Tax Commission has placed a most 
practical interpretation upon 80-15-5, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, and that to place any other interpretation thereon 
would work a hardship upon the vendors who have come 
to rely upon the Commission's regulation and who would be 
required to deposit negotiable securities. Furthermore, we 
submit that a holding that the Commission has authority to 
require the type of security upon which this suit is predi-
cated is a sine qua non to the successful administration of 
the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933. 
We urge that the posting of a surety bond with suf-
ficient personal sureties, or a corporate surety, furnishes 
adequate security to insure that the tax will be paid; that 
the only purpose of requiring such security is to insure that 
the tax will be paid, and, therefore, the Commission by re-
quiring the posting of a surety bond of the nature upon 
which this suit is predicated evidences a sufficient com-
pliance with the terms of the Act. 
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The appellant respectfully submits that the decision 
of the lower court should be set aside and the case remanded 
for further proceedings pursuant to law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
G. H:AL TAYLOR, 
WAYNE CHRISTOFFERSEN, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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